The Bankruptcy of Aesthetic Autonomy: Music as a Social Praxis and Agency

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ABSTRACT

For many years, music education has followed the theory that it is rationalized in schools as aesthetic education. For many years, I have argued against this theory in numerous journal articles and books. The following is a light summary of my philosophy of music as a social praxis and form of agency. It is intended especially for pre-service students, and for those new to my oeuvre, as an overview of many years of advancing praxis rather than aesthetics as the basis for music education.

Keywords: aesthetic education, musical praxis, social praxis, music appreciation, aesthetic history

Introduction

Music teachers are often inclined to judge the music they encountered during their conservatory-like training as aesthetically valuable. Consequently, their assumption that music is a ‘fine’ art that promotes aesthetic experience is easily taken for granted in rationalizing the value of music education in schools. Just offering routine musical activities and performances is thereby assumed to trigger students’ aesthetic appreciation. The study of music in schools (and private lessons) supposedly induces a favorable receptivity for ‘good music’ in students otherwise over-burdened with popular fare in the home and
media. Whether or not such school experiences have led to an enriched life of musicing out of school, after graduation, and as adults is not assessed. Often it is not even in mind!

I will show that aesthetic claims of musical value assumed by these teachers and their professors is unwarranted—that they accept aesthetic claims despite their unfamiliarity with the philosophy of art and music. Thus they don’t realize that the “aesthetic theory of art” is only one account of art and music. It is clearly contradicted by the history of aesthetic theorizing itself that musically helped institutionalize bourgeois social climbing in the 18th and 19th centuries. Those social dynamics were largely responsible from the first for the invention of ‘classical’ music and ‘fine’ art.¹

I shall argue for a philosophy of music as praxis.² My thesis is that the value of music is musicing—actively ‘doing’ music in all its various forms—including attentive listening—not the “refined” aesthetic experiences promised by teachers and music professors who don’t study aesthetics. As praxis, music is good to the degree it satisfies the many social and even practical needs that brings different types of music into being to begin with: good church music, good concert music, good dancing music, and many other ‘good fors’ that qualify why a music praxis exists at all.

Aesthetic hierarchy
The idea of ‘fine’ arts are distinguished by aesthetes from ‘not so fine’ arts and crafts, and from popular, ethnic, and other exoteric arts. That idea led to the creation of a socio-artistic hierarchy; a “taste group,” devoted to ‘high culture’; and a ‘fine’ arts based ideology that is supposedly ‘above’ the allegedly un-cultured social classes and their merely “agreeable” or entertaining arts (”agreeable” is Kant’s term of condescension). This hierarchy is intensified by the fact that the ‘fine’ arts are expensive. A social gap thus resulted between those less privileged groups and more advantaged socioeconomic classes.
AN AESTHETIC HIERARCHY

**high**

- **Chamber music and solos**—‘pure’ music, small scale, intimate audiences
- **Symphonies and Concertos**—absolute music, but size is appealing; large audience
- **Vocal and choral music**—meaning tied to words; strictly musical value thus reduced
- **Opera**—not only has words, but scenery, action, dramatic or humorous plots and characters
- **Program and Nationalistic music**—based on stories, images, and national folk music.

... **Marches, ceremonial, and occasional music**—tied to or abstracted from social uses

- **Religious music**—serves liturgy or has a religious text and meaning, oratorios, passions
- **Jazz (?)**—not notated, entertainment not ‘art’, typically performed in social settings (e.g., clubs)
- **Ethnic music**—tied to ethnic tunes, dances, or words, easily appreciated by listeners.

**low**

- **Popular music**—for entertainment, popularity soon fades, easily understood, typically sung

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**Figure 1: An Aesthetic Hierarchy**

The invention and subsequent rise of aesthetic theories during the last half of the 18th century depreciated the many traditional, socially constituted praxes of art and music that governed daily and artistic life since the Greeks. They fostered a new social class of critics, connoisseurs, and aesthetes that extolled the superiority, rather than the simple differences of the ‘fine’ arts of ‘high culture’ over other arts that daily serve society and culture. That new social class especially confused the fact that ‘classical’ is a *type*, not a
quality of music. However, aesthetic autonomy, or the “aesthetic attitude” of “absolute music” one is supposed to bring to music, denies any connection of music to worldly references or ideas, including words—as the diagram above shows. So-called “free beauty” is free of such references to nature, love, God, and much more. “Dependent beauty” is beauty that is directly related to the world: for example, a painting of a rose that looks like a real rose.

Instead of this rarefied disassociation of music from the world, I offer a critical philosophy of such aesthetic theorizing in the analytic philosophy of art. “Critical philosophy” is a philosophical methodology in the legacy of Kant that judges the validity of a theory according to how well its claims withstand critical challenge. I’ll focus on the key liabilities of analytic aesthetics and the many implications of aesthetic theorizing that have not been to the advantage of music education in contemporary schooling.

The critical perspective offered here negates the gap between aesthetic theories and music as social praxis, the value of which is the sociality borne by music in all its forms and formats. The value of music education, then, is not its claims to supposed aesthetic benefits. Rather, its value is seen in clearly pragmatic musical benefits for the lives of students, grown into adults.

Musical sociality and praxis
“Sociality” is a process of human interaction through institutions, paradigms, and communal structures of various kinds. We are social beings—especially due to language and music! Music is intrinsically social because it invokes, evokes, and totally engages human connectedness. Music is a result of the interaction between people and sounds they call “music.” Thus music, motivates and conditions sociality, and also is a product of sociality. Musical meaning, then, is not in the sounds or their relationships so avidly pursued in form analysis studies; but is in or of the interaction of such sounds within the sociocultural structures, contexts, uses, and other governing particulars of musical situatedness. The social dimension of music is therefore importantly determining of music’s meaning, and music is importantly determining of human sociality.4
In this reciprocal relationship, music’s social role is somewhat comparable to spoken language. Both are creative of, at the same time they are created by sociality. And in neither do sounds inherently signify fixed meanings. There is nothing about the sound of the word “pain” that is homologous with the experience of pain. Meanings associated with the sounds of music, like the sounds of words, similarly depend on social and cultural conformations, and are ultimately governed by the way and the situations in which they are used and evolve over time.\(^5\)

For instance, a Bach chorale sung by parishioners in a church service has a considerably different meaning and value than those same notes performed on the secular concert stage in Bach’s *St. Matthew Passion*. Similarly, a secular love song in a wedding takes on a religious and ceremonial meaning. Just as the meanings of words vary according to usage recorded in etymological dictionaries, so do the meanings of music—even in conjunction with “classics” of the past that adjust to ever-new sensibilities and interpretations, new life situations, experiences, and instrument technology.\(^6\)

Musical sociality, therefore, conditions a range of possible meanings, but without providing the kind of ‘built in’ meanings implied by “pure gaze” aesthetic autonomy divorced from life. Sounds and their embodiment in perception, however, do have certain material conditions, and the range of socially acknowledged meanings that arise from the sociality of music mitigate the silly relativism of “anything goes.” Music’s sociality is sometimes even central to arousing people to engage with social problems. The Estonian revolution for independence from the USSR (1987–1991) is rightfully called the “singing revolution,” given the role of singing in Estonian protests for national freedom. Another example is “We shall overcome,” as the anthem of the civil rights movement and Dr. Martin Luther King.

Sound intended, evoked, or invoked by or for a social praxis, then, becomes “musical sound”—in other words, “music”—in terms of that social praxis and its criteria. The sounds themselves make a social praxis meaningful at the same time that they are made special (which is to say, into “music”) by the praxis.\(^7\) The relationship is thereby totally reciprocal and no distinction between internal-external, intrinsic-extrinsic, inherent-delineated
meanings and values can ever be valid. Aesthetic accounts simply falsify the down-to-earth holistic values of all kinds of musics and musical experiences.\(^8\)

**Praxis Theory**

Praxis theory accounts for *all* musicing. Firstly, the very existence of a boundless variety of kinds, types, styles, and genres of music is in itself evidence that music is as varied as the human sociality that from the beginning gives rise to all musicing. Furthermore, *at best*, aesthetic theory is historically limited and largely false to modern musical life. And, *at worst*, aesthetic theory was, even in its prime, fault-ridden in its attempts to be “classy” in demonstrating “refined” taste and “social distinction.”\(^9\) The aesthetic orthodoxy has also caused the dramatic decline since the 19\(^{th}\) century in amateur and recreational music making of all kinds—because amateurism falls short of ‘high’ aesthetic criteria!

Secondly, praxis theory emphasizes that all the kinds, types and genres of music are “good for” an unconceivable diversity of “good results”—as Aristotle called the benefits of praxis. All kinds of useful roles for music, then, fall within the range of praxial theory. The overwhelming preponderance of music in the world—as poet-songwriter Ani DiFranco puts it, “the indigenous, unhomogenized, uncalculated sound of a culture becoming itself in the streets, bars, gyms, churches and back porches of the real world,”—all music is clearly created for a unending diversity of life’s special social values.

But, in this connection, the autonomy claimed by aesthetic theory, the supposed “pure gaze,” either denies or deprecates the social value of such music; or attempts to tear such music from its natural and necessary social context to exhibit it for contemplation alone, as though it could become purely aesthetic despite its origins in situated sociality. Attempts to apply aesthetic criteria to world and ethnic musics result in a Eurocentric aesthetic colonialization that devalues the authentic musical meanings engaged only *in situ* by its creators.\(^10\)

In sum, then, praxis theory accounts fully for all kinds and uses of music, and it finds musical value not in cerebral intellectualizations of ‘pure’ music, but in the constituting sociality of music—and in the functional importance of music for the institutions that
govern the “social mind.” To be sure, it also addresses “concert music” (of all kinds) that is presented for “just listening” as equally imbued with sociality and as a discrete praxis that is no more or less important than other kinds of musical ‘doing’.

Furthermore, whether just listening in concert situations or alone at home, praxial theories account for and point to the value of all kinds of musicing in terms of the “good time” thereby created; time that is deemed “worthwhile” (and “worthwhile” means, literally, “valued time”)—time that is deemed valuable in relation to both music’s sociality and its individuating benefits. Thus, as opposed to time we “kill,” “pass,” “waste” or “spend,” the “good time” resulting from musical praxis is a resource that promotes a variety of socially structured meanings in which the individual participates in a way that is nonetheless self-defining and self-enhancing.

In particular, then, praxial theories provide support for all kinds of amateur, ethnic, and recreational uses of music, uses that are neither valid nor valuable according to the aesthetic orthodoxy. In its social expansiveness and relevance, a praxis-based music education merges with community music. Both promote pragmatic and social benefits of musicing.

But, music does not just “accompany” its social uses in a secondary role. Firstly, it is intrinsic to and defining of the very value-structure of the use (e.g., the Catholic mass set to music); and secondly, at the same time the sociality entailed is intrinsic to and defining of “the music” and its meaning and value. In the praxial account, then, music is of and for the down-to-earth conditions of everyday life and of life well-lived in terms of the “good time” thus created. It is not in some “pure” or other-worldly realm that exists for its own sake. Rather, music’s meaning and value are in and for action and human agency—for social ‘doings’ of all kinds. Consequently, music ‘speaks to’ all people and everyday life. Accordingly, praxial theory is a more relevant and pragmatic foundation for the decisions guiding curriculum for music education.
From aesthetics to modernism

From Ancient Greece until the Renaissance the arts were admired for their practical, useful, contributions to individuals and society. Their social ‘doings’ served the Church, royalty, courtiers, bourgeoisie, commoners, even the peasants according to their effectiveness for “making special” social events, needs, and occasions that would otherwise be conventional. But among the historical reasons for the social invention and elevation of ‘fine’ art are the philosophical revival from ancient Greece that in the Renaissance (14th-17th centuries) was applied to the traditional status of the arts as praxis. That revival of classical Greek learning replaced the religious austerity and scholastic philosophy of the late Middle Ages in favor of a humanist ideal. For Renaissance humanism, “man is the measure of all things.” Consequently, recognition of an individuated Self gained popular acceptance. Renaissance artists, authors, and composers began take personal credit for their creations by signing them.

However, Renaissance arts and music recounted in today’s history books were still closely wed to their praxis in religion and the court; and to the social lives of nobles, courtiers, and the aristocracy. For example, the “courtly love” (Fin'amor; Amour Courtois) of the ‘high’ (late) Middle Ages (11th-12th century), as recounted in troubadour and trouvère songs, was predicated on the Neo-Platonic ideal of a knight serving his courtly lady. These songs evolved into the sentimental love themes of Renaissance madrigals and gave social momentum to modernity’s concept of romantic love. Eventually, the meme of romantic love found its way into popular love songs, romance novels, amatory sonnets and poems, TV soap operas, films, and the like.

During the Renaissance a new interest in nature was promoted by the revival of Aristotle’s philosophical concern with aisthesis—or knowledge gained from the senses. In the arts, psychological language came into social vogue and the arts were all the more valued because of the attractive, affective, aisthesis, sensuous and social qualities they offered. Aside from its contribution to new interest in science, then, aisthesis became a distinctive sensibility associated with affective personal references in art and music. And by the late 16th century references to visual arts, music, architecture, and literature as the
“sister arts” began to take form. By the 18th century, the revolution in intellectual and rational thinking known as the Enlightenment coalesced theorizing about the sister arts into the speculative-rationalistic aesthetic account of the values of art and music. This aesthetic account rejected the universal social praxis values of previous centuries.

This development overlooked the fact, however, that concert listening, theater performance, and gallery attendance are social practices influenced in part by the spatial semiotics in which each takes place. Upon entering a concert hall, the spatial semiotics of the architecture resonate with the use of that space. The same goes with a church. Moreover, what individuals respond to cognitively and emotionally, when and in what ways are all constituted by important social variables, institutions, traditions, and praxes, among them social praxes such as music and the other arts. Thus music and the arts are socially conditioned by their traditions of use in a society; and, at the same time, contribute importantly to constituting present-day society and sociality.

Home (or salon) performances were a primary form of musical sociality. Only gradually did they move out of the drawing room into public concerts for pay. Yet, salon evenings of music were still a common praxis up through Beethoven’s middle period. Schubert may have been the first major composer to earn a living from concerts and sales of his manuscripts.

The claim for the autonomy of art and music arose with the invention of aesthetics and “art for art’s sake” aestheticism. Thus art and music were thoroughly divorced—and appropriately so according to aesthetes!—from the sociality, human contexts, and functions that always have elicited and characterized them. Instead they became a sign of social refinement associated with ‘classy’ taste and became an increasingly expensive leisure time pursuit. This ‘high culture’ raised art and music to ‘classy’ status, thus further separating it from the general public and their lives.

However, the social sources of aesthetic ideology were themselves or studiously ignored. In truth, aesthetics was not ‘discovered’. The praxis of art and music for the rising 18th century bourgeoisie was its practical uselessness: its uselessness demonstrated conspicuous wealth, social capital, and prestige. It was thus socially influenced from its
onset by the *nouveau riche* of the rising middle class and its aspirations to aristocratic status. History has accounted mainly for these ‘fine’ arts, thus addressing only a small fraction of all the art and music in the world.

For aestheticians the ‘fine’ arts were understood in terms of “purposiveness without purpose”: their only purpose was to be art contemplated “for its own sake”—that is, purposively impractical and valued only as art. This separation of lived values and art thus depends on “disinterestedness”—the so-called *aesthetic attitude* one should bring to works of art in order to ‘properly’ evoke ‘pure’ aesthetic experiences.

Aesthetic theorizing about a “disinterested aesthetic attitude” created the idea that art is *autonomous*; that is, independent of extrinsic, social, or useful purposes. In fact, the lack of pragmatic purposes (e.g., an actual funeral) supposedly fosters a suitably ‘pure’ and ‘disinterested’ contemplative response of sadness (e.g., to Chopin’s *Sonata #2*, 3rd mouvement, *Marche funèbre*). The socially decontextualized “autonomania” of such aestheticism, as it has been called by one philosophical critic, makes music seem to have come from Mars.

The practice of contemplating music as though for its own sake was advanced by the social evolution of public concerts. Following the impact of aesthetic theorizing, aristocratic and bourgeois salon musicing (Hausmusik) moved from the drawing room to public concert audiences. Now for pay, but accompanied by the same haughtiness of demeanor. Concert etiquette, in accordance with aesthetic doctrine, eventually trained the hoi polloi to adopt the ‘classy’ restraint (as in the salon) and dress that is still expected today. Concert halls for ‘classical’ music eventually became *museums* for periodic moments of savoring “Great Works” of music history, not for daily life-connected values. These concerts, again, are influenced by the spatial semiotics of a concert hall, the sociality of an audience (such as clapping, attire), intermission chatter, and the social history of music in a particular culture (e.g., attunement to Western pitch classes). The arts quickly became bourgeois commodities to be sold and displayed, and ‘classical’ music was socially *distantiated* from other musics as the disposition of refined upper class discrimination.
In response to this commodification, the new *aesthetic orthodoxy* diverted attention from the many social and personal uses and values of art and music that nonetheless continued to serve a variety of essential roles in daily life (marches, lullabies, religion, patriotism, folk musics). Most 19th century philosophers managed to work aesthetics into their ‘grand’ theory, but usually in contradiction to other philosophers. Modern artist Barnett Newman (1905-1970) summed up his distaste for such abstruse theorizing with the axiom, “Aesthetics is for the artist as ornithology is for the birds.”

**Music appreciation**

What then is “appreciation?” Most people know nothing of aesthetic theorizing—including music teachers. Thus knowledge of it cannot be needed for appreciation. Appreciation is instead seen in the *uses* people make of music in ways that contribute meaning to their lives. The *musical praxes* people include in their lives (or don’t) are *empirical evidence* of their appreciation. This means that music educators need to be focused on life-long uses of music.

Musicians don’t need or use aesthetic jargon or concepts in their praxis! Most are also unaware of the debates by aestheticians about the performance of music (with its emphasis on “interpretation”) versus performance as music (where performers are the final creators). Those adopting the latter view are inclined to a praxis-oriented view—the emphasis being that the music, as situated in the present performance, is “the music,” not a score.

Nonetheless, the arts—especially the ‘fine’ arts of ‘high culture’—still carry a special aura. Cultural historians have noted what they call the “sacralization” of music and art. Over history, they have taken on a quasi-religious social aura that has been thought to replace the religious or spiritual dimension of life that was sidelined by the Enlightenment’s championing of reason and science. To those so convinced, artists, composers, and performers are like priests, mystics, or spiritual seers. However, this sacralization has resulted in the *social class hierarchy* and *commodification* already mentioned. Even with government subsidies in some countries, most people...
satisfy themselves with recordings, TV and film drama, and art reproductions. However, recorded music—even “live recording”—is unquestionably influenced by recording engineers. “The music,” then, is not as is heard in a concert. And, of course, attendance at a concert is social, with the audience sharing an affective yet social affinity.

Even recordings listened to alone have multiple social roots. Listeners typically belong to taste groups and are otherwise socially influenced—such as by music reviews, advertising, audiophile interests, and Facebook recommendations. And, at home you can conduct along with the music without reproach (and go to the bathroom!). And prior familiarity with a recording—or with different recordings of the same composition—inevitably influences its present hearing. Recorded music and collecting recordings is thus a musical praxis of its own.

Contemporary artists—including today’s composers—are motivated to make public, political, and social ‘statements’ through their art. Art and music have again become relevant to social concerns and values, and persist in nagging us to think again and again about what we take for granted as reality or as our values. For example, John Adams 1991 opera The Death of Klinghoffer, with libretto based on a true tragedy, led to accusations of anti-American, anti-Semitic and anti-bourgeois prejudice, and considerable social controversy. Yet it was revived in 2014 by the Metropolitan Opera.

Today, aestheticians employ their ideology by vainly trying to account aesthetically for John Cage’s 4’33” (of silence) and for other bold departures of new musics from traditional expectations. Concert audiences seated surrounding the players introduce new variables. Cacophony often seems to reign. Yet aestheticians nonetheless continue to propound 18th century speculations and arguments that have little or no relevance to how we experience music of any kind.

Admittedly, what is offered in major public galleries and concert halls these days still observes the autonomy premise of art for art’s sake. In this, little has changed: ‘classical’ music still serves the functions of social prestige, wealth, and social class distinction observed by sociologist Pierre Bourdieu who pronounced that nothing distinguishes people in terms of social class more than their preferences in music.
Conclusions

To overcome the sacralized aesthetic aura and the ‘high’-class social connotations or aesthetic autonomy, music educators need to overcome the fallacies that mere exposure to ‘good music’ in schools amounts to an effective music education that serves students in their adult lives; or that lessons for beginners should be predicated on future concert careers; or that background information about music is the same as the study of music. It is seriously mistaken to assume that supposed aesthetic values somehow and automatically, infiltrate students’ musical responsiveness and choices through mere contact! Instead, musical studies need to develop musicianship skills for use in enhancing daily life.

Instruction should then model for students the potential ways music can be incorporated in adult life—including ever-new music technology and computer software. It requires a focus on independent musicianship. And since time in adult life is not always easily arranged for regular large ensemble rehearsals, experience with chamber musics is imperative. Participatory musics—musics that have a strong social component (like Barbershop singing, instrumental duets and trios for home musicing pleasures) need to be balanced with presentational concert performances for audiences. Emphasis should be on developing attitudes, dispositions, and values favorable to lifelong musicing. Students who acquire competence—at least as beginners—with one or more musical prax is have a functional basis for lifelong development and use. Basic musicianship that is generalizable to several musical prax is is most pragmatic; for example, folk chords on the guitar as bases for jazz chords.

Once music teachers bypass aesthetic assumptions and habits in favor of long-lasting musicianship needed for various kinds of accessible musical prax, their efforts will be rewarded by greater support from and contributions to musicing in local communities. Such learning will be evident to students (and thus motivating); to teachers (and thus useful in planning); to administrators (thus demonstrating worth); to parents and taxpayers (who will support school music); to society (members of which will have more choices for musicing); and to education ministries (whatever they do). In sum, such tangible benefits of a praxis-premised music education will have important contributions
to the flourishing of musical praxis in society and to the lasting social values of school music education to a community.

Notes


3 Music serving specific social occasions; e.g., patriotic music; Tchaikovsky’s *Festival Coronation March* (D major, TH 50, ČW 47,) commissioned by the city of Moscow for the coronation of Tsar Aleander III, 1883.

4 Sociologists of music maintain that to really understand a particular culture, you need to understand its music: why it exists, where and when it is featured, and what the criteria are of “good” music for that culture. Likewise, you thus need to understand the culture in order to understand its music.


6 For example, technological improvements in instruments (piston valves); performing Bach on the modern grand piano or marimba; the ‘romantic’ Samuel Barber *Adagio for Strings* as used in the war movie *Platoon*; 2 electronic pianos, bass, and drum set replacing a pit orchestra for musicals, (etc.).

7 Some Islamic sects disapprove of “music” *per se* but condone in their religious praxis what other cultures describe as unaccompanied sung “prayer.”

8 For detailed analyses of music and sociality see the scholarship from sociology of music and ethnomusicology. These disciplines are not usually taught in (North American) university schools of music, probably because they contradict the “pure gaze” premises of aesthetic autonomy taken for granted in such programs. In some places, for example, “music education” is taught through departments of social and cultural theory, not in “schools of music” (e.g., Örebrö Sweden).

10 When performed publically for audiences, such musics become “concert music” (a different praxis) for listening and no longer serve (for concert audiences, at least) their original situated, praxial values. Performers may, however, still be give evidence of the originating praxial functions (e.g. performances of “Kodō,” the Japanese *taiko* drumming ensemble whose mesmerizing concert performing is, for them, a spiritual discipline, even in concert).

11 On the social mind, see George Herbert Mead.

12 Such “good time” described should not be confused with mere “fun time.” Again, it equals the word *worth* (good)-*while* (time).


16 Summers, *The Judgement of Sense*. Such language depended on recognition of a “personal” Self that ‘has’ such emotions.


19 Kövecses. *Metaphor and Emotion*


23 Except for divertimenti and other background music for aristocratic socializing: e.g., Mozart’s divertissement *Eine Kline Nactsmusik*. He would be amused at today’s audiences who actually listen to this background music for its supposed aesthetic values.


25 Thomas A. Regelski, “Autonomania”


35 Stuart Jeffries. *Grand Hotel Abyss*, pp. 21–22; see also n. 33.


38 For an awkward attempt to interpret Cage’s 4’33” in terms of analytic aesthetics as art but not music, see Stephen Davies, *Themes in the Philosophy of Music*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; 11–29. Other strained attempts at rationalizing contemporary musics based on 18th-19th analytic aesthetics are in Davies’ following chapters.

39 “A mix of discordant sounds; dissonance,” as per Wordnik.com


42 For the distinction between participatory and presentational musics, see: Thomas Turino. *Music as Social Life: The Politics of Participation*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008. Continuation of which as adults is most likely for students who get enamored of participatory musics while still in school.